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Music: Joy Ike’s “The Fall Song”

Guy Charles: The future of voting rights policy should focus on developing a new political as
well legal consensus, in which voting is regarded as a universal and fundamental right, and
which is made available to all.

Cary Coglianese: That’s law professor Guy Charles, delivering a lecture at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School organized by the Penn Program on Regulation. I’m Cary Coglianese,
the director of the Penn Program on Regulation and a professor at the University of
Pennsylvania. Welcome to our podcast, “Race and Regulation.” In this series, we are talking
about the most fundamental responsibility of every society: ensuring equal justice, and dignity
and respect, to all people. Advancing racial justice calls for all of us to understand better the
racial dimensions of regulatory systems and institutions.

We’re glad you can join us as we hear from Professor Charles, a professor of law at Harvard
Law School. He is one of the nation’s leading scholars working on issues of race, democratic
participation, and the laws surrounding elections. His lecture at the University of Pennsylvania
was the tenth annual Distinguished Lecture on Regulation.

He focused on one of the most foundational legal arenas: the rules governing voting and
elections. No regulatory domain can be as essential to a just and equitable society as the one that
governs democratic representation.

GC: Structural political inequality and structural racial inequality are mutually reinforcing, and
that we can’t solve racial discrimination in voting without a vigorous commitment to resolving
political inequality, as well as vice versa. That our commitment to political equality must also
include a commitment to eradicating racial discrimination in voting.

CC: In recent times, legislatures in many states have considered changing their voting
laws. Some of the changes that have passed would make it harder for people to vote. But voting
barriers do not affect everyone equally. Particular concern exists over disproportionate impacts
on Black voters. The inextricable link between racial equality and political equality leads
Professor Charles to shift toward a universal egalitarianism with respect to voting rights. This
shift would lead to a nationally recognized, uniform set of voting rules.

GC: Our commitment to political equality must be centralized, nationalized, and taken away
from the states. That is where we agree that there are certain sets of practices that advance
political equality and that there are certain sets of practices that undermine political equality. We
should preclude the states from enacting those sets of practices, and we should nationalize those
practices.

CC: The kinds of practices Professor Charles has in mind are designed to expand ballot access to
all adults. These practices can include such measures as automatic voter registration, same-day
registration, online and mail-in voting. They include making election day a national holiday,
limiting voter disenfranchisement, and ending partisan gerrymandering.

To illustrate the importance and legality of nationally-guaranteed universal ballot access,
Professor Charles takes a step back into U.S. legal history. The role for national protections of
democratic rights, as well as the central linkages between racial and political equality, come
through in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1960 decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. This case centered
on the Alabama state legislature’s changes to the electoral map in the city of Tuskegee. The
changes almost entirely eliminated Black residents from the city’s voting base. The Supreme
Court declared that the changes violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibits states from diminishing anyone of their right to vote on the basis of race.
Professor Charles begins with the Black residents’ lawyer delivering his argument to the Court.

GC: Fred D. Gray stood before the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States on
October 18, 1960, to show them a giant map. Gray was only 30 years old at the time, but he was
already, then, a noted civil rights lawyer and preacher. A native of Montgomery, Alabama, he

attended the law school in Ohio because no other law school in Alabama would admit Black
people. When he faced the Court on that Tuesday afternoon as co-counsel on the gerrymandering
case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, this young, Black civil rights lawyer was nevertheless an
experienced hand in making the legal case against the hegemonic regime of the Jim Crow South
and its idiosyncratic brand of racial discrimination. Gray, along with Charles Langford, Robert
Carter—they were the lawyers for the civil rights activists in Gayle v. Browder, which
challenged Montgomery’s Jim Crow bus system. And the challenges prevailed before a threejudge trial court. In a rebuke to Alabama, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment
by issuing a one-sentence order citing Brown v. Board. Without having to say much, the Court
sent a very clear message that Plessy was no longer the law of the land.

Now, Gray confronted a very different problem in Gomillion than the one presented in Gayle v.
Browder. In Gayle, he simply had to get the judges to apply the principles of Brown v. Board to
the context of public accommodations. Both the law and the facts were on his side in that case.
Alabama’s law permitting racial discrimination in public accommodation was clearly
inconsistent with Brown. And the racial discrimination there was undeniably evident on the face
of the statute—a law that required racial segregation was racial discrimination.

By contrast, though, Gomillion posed an epistemic challenge for Gray and his team. They had to
prove that the redrawing of the boundaries of Tuskegee was a racial gerrymander—that is, a
segregation of the races—and not a political gerrymander, or simply a remapping of the
municipal boundaries. A racial gerrymander, of course, would have been unconstitutional, but a
political gerrymander, or change simply in the municipal boundaries, was within the sovereign
power of the state under the law of the time. So, unlike Gayle, in which the evidence of racial
discrimination was evident on the face of the statute, the statue in Gomillion did not say anything
about race, or really anything other than latitude and longitude.

Now, there was no doubt about the fact that the remapping of Tuskegee was a blatant racial
gerrymander. Sam Engelhardt, the state senator who authored the statute in the Alabama
legislature, was crystal clear about the statute’s purpose. He said to exclude colored voters who
might become the balance of power in Tuskegee city elections. According to the existing legal
doctrine of the time, the state’s motivation, which did not appear on the face of the statute, was
not a relevant consideration for ascertaining the constitutionality of the statute. So, unless the
plaintiffs could convince a court and the Supreme Court to take motive into account, or that the
redrawing of the lines was a racial gerrymander, the Supreme Court would defer to the state’s
assertion of its sovereignty to structure its political system as it saw fit. As the state argued, we
have a right to implement our conception of political equality. And as long as we are not
expressly engaged in racial discrimination, that right ought to be respected.

Now, though Gray did not have much in the way of admissible evidence, he did have a map. The
map illustrated, literally, the egregiousness of the state’s racial discrimination. “Look at the
map,” Gray urged the Justices. The lines of the map represented how Alabama removed almost
every single registered Black voter from the City of Tuskegee but not a single white person,
much less a white voter. It was clear from the jagged lines of the map that this was not a normal
redrawing of the municipal boundaries. The state’s exclusionary purpose and the effect, Gray
stated to the Justices, is revealed by the map.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

CC: Before the Alabama legislature had redrawn Tuskegee’s borders, the map of its voting
district had been shaped as a square. Afterwards, it was a 28-sided figure. Twenty-eight sides!
That alone showed the discriminatory purpose of the state’s redistricting: the point was to keep
Black residents from gaining political power.

GC: It did not take any imagination to figure out what Alabama was up to. Everyone knew what
the state was doing and that it was doing all that it could to prevent Black people from being able
to register and to vote. Tuskegee and Macon County were both racial oligarchies. The majority
population in Tuskegee and Macon County were Black, outnumbering whites. Black people
outnumbered whites five to one in Tuskegee and six to one in Macon County. But white people
held all the political power. There were no Black elected officials at any levels in the city or
county. And in fact, Bernard Tapper, in his book on Gomillion, relayed the indignation and
shock of local white residents when a Black woman, Jessie Guzman, Director of the Department
of Research and Records at the Tuskegee Institute, ran for a seat on the Macon County School
Board. So they were indignant that a Black person would dare run for election.

CC: And yet as clear as the facts were, the Black voters faced obstacles in terms of the law.

GC: The fact that all knew that states like Alabama were practicing gross racial discrimination
did not mean that the courts would be solicitous to cries for redress by Black plaintiffs or their
allies.

CC: In fact, by the time the litigation had reached the Supreme Court, two lower courts had
already ruled in favor of Alabama. As Professor Charles explains, the prevailing understanding

of constitutional law was an obstacle in Gomillion, even though the Supreme Court had six years
earlier decided Brown v. Board of Education. The Court in Brown overturned Plessy v.
Ferguson, famously rejecting the separate-but-equal doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause. But the Brown Court had confronted segregation laws that embedded
racial distinctions in state law itself.

GC: Brown‘s articulation of constitutional equality was inarguably beneficial to Black people
subjected to Jim Crow discrimination. However, the new legal framework also made it possible
for the government to shield its discrimination under the cloak of neutrality. So, unlike the
school desegregation cases, or cases in which the government used an explicit racial
classification, here the act did not use an explicit racial classification.

CC: Professor Charles notes that the Alabama law redrawing Tuskegee’s voting map said
“nothing about race at all.”

GC: The statute, on its face, was a redistricting statute. So the substantive content consisted of a
series of instructions under the new municipal lines of the reconstructed city. So the act provided
that the new city would begin at the northwest corner of Section 30, Township 17-N, Range 24-E
in Macon County, Alabama that would proceed south 89 degrees, 53 minutes east, 111 feet, then
south 37 degrees, 34 minutes east, and continue that way until it mapped out the full lines of the
new city.

So Alabama could, and did, plead both race neutrality and state sovereignty. They argued that the
redrawing of the city was just that; it was a map that drew new boundaries of a subsidiary of the
state, not a statute that separated the races upon its face, and then altering the configurations of a
political or municipal boundaries is wholly within the power of the state. We have the right to
draw our municipal lines and to determine who belongs and who ought to have political
authority per our state sovereignty. Was not at all relevant, motives were not relevant in
assessing the constitutionality of the statute.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

CC: The motives had been clear. As Professor Charles mentioned, the principal legislative
architect of the Tuskegee redistricting was state senator Sam Engelhardt, who had openly
admitted that his aim was to dilute Black residents’ political power.

GC: So Sam Engelhardt viewed the Black community as an ever-present threat to white political
power and anticipated that eventually something more would need to be done. He had long
advocated the ingenious plan of removing the Black residents from the city by redrawing the
boundaries of the town. He argued that gerrymandering would be an effective way of dealing
with insipient Black local power because the courts would defer to the right of the state to draw
the boundaries of its municipalities as it wanted. Engelhardt’s scheme was not just restricted to
Tuskegee, by the way. State leaders were preparing to do the same in Macon County, Alabama.
In fact, Alabama had amended its constitution to give the legislature the option of abolishing
Macon County or reducing its area. Presumably, this is a strategy that could be replicated across
the state and across the region.

So here is the point that I want to make: Gomillion vividly presents the symbiotic relationship
between structural political inequality and structural racial inequality. Alabama’s plan to remove
the Black residents from Tuskegee, and ultimately from Macon County, was possible and
sensible only because the Constitution allowed the states to create unequal political units. To put
it more precisely, Alabama could contemplate gerrymandering Black citizens out of Macon
County because the Court did not interpret the Constitution to require the states to create political
units that weighed votes equally. The Court allowed the states to engage in a political oligarchy.
Alabama was then subject to two different regulatory regimes, one of which allowed it to do
whatever it wanted to do with respect to the citizens in its political units, and the other of which
required it to grant its citizens equal suffrage rights on the basis of race. One in which it was
regulated, and the other in which it was unregulated.

Correspondingly, Black citizens were also subjected to two different types of legal regimes. If
they were categorized on the basis of their race, they were entitled to equal suffrage rights. But if
they were categorized by geography or by political unit or by political party, they were then
treated unequally. These different regulatory regimes presented Alabama with an arbitrage
opportunity. The constitutional system was going to prevent Alabama from denying suffrage
rights to Black people, but it was not going to prevent Alabama from favoring one set of political
units over another. Alabama could still achieve its racially discriminatory aims, that is to oppress
the voting rights of its Black citizens, by placing them in disfavored political units. Alabama
simply needed to convince the federal courts that the Constitution respected the states’ plenary
rights to redefine the boundaries of its substate jurisdiction as it saw fit. This is a non-justiciable
political question and notwithstanding the discriminatory effects, and maybe even the
discriminatory purpose, the state had the sovereign power to do as it wanted to. But differently,
Alabama simply had to convince the federal courts that the state had the right to elect between

two different regulatory regimes, and so long as Alabama could shield its racism behind the veil
of state sovereignty, Alabama could maintain its racial and its political oligarchy.

The point is that racial oligarchy and political oligarchy are intertwined and that it is hard to have
one without the other. And here, the question simply, in Gomillion, was whether the federal
courts were willing to go along. And, they almost did.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

CC: The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the two lower courts and held that, “When a
legislature singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory
treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.” Even though the Alabama law did not explicitly
refer to race, its racially discriminatory manifestations were far too stark and too ugly for the
Court to ignore.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

The Supreme Court litigation in Gomillion vs. Lightfoot has more than just historical
significance. Professor Charles explains that the case, and the legal arguments raised within it,
also reveal much about the challenges facing the United States today in terms of both political
and racial equality.

GC: Gomillion demonstrates the challenge posed to plaintiffs bringing voting equality claims by
the legal system’s default presumption of plenary and legitimate state power. This is a challenge
that would seem to favor the state in part because the legal regime saw state authority as
presumptively legitimate. And in many respects, we still do. When the state regulates on the
basis of its authority to structure its local process, we simply defer. And in part because the claim
of racial discrimination in Gomillion raised some, if not significant epistemic uncertainties, the
questions were very complicated, and they still are today. Right? Is a voter ID a racially
discriminatory device? Or is it simply the state deciding for itself what it wants to do with
respect to its local system?

Gomillion arose in the post-Brown legal context, where there was very little doubt that the Court
wouldn’t enforce the Constitution’s prohibition against racial discrimination when the
discrimination was evident on the face of the statute. But it was concomitantly less clear what the
Court would do when racial discrimination was not so evident. Gomillion thus presented a direct
confrontation with assertions of state power and racial equality.

Now, Gomillion was not just a race case, it was a voting case as well. That is, adding to the
complexity of the case, the voting question here was conceptually mushy. On the one hand, one
could characterize the constitutional claims in Gomillion as vote denial claims. That is, the
deprivation of suffrage rights on the basis of race, and if so characterized, the decisions in, say,
the white primary cases left no doubt that the Court would vindicate representational rights under
those circumstances.

On the other hand, one could characterize the representational claims as dilution claims. That is,
claims about relative voting power on the basis of group identity brought about by the design of
representational structures. And if so characterized, the Court’s decision in Colegrove v. Green, a
malapportionment case, made clear that the Court would not vindicate other types of
representational claims that were primarily about the composition of electoral structures or
structures of representation.

So Gomillion presented a multifaceted puzzle that continues to bedevil and trouble the Court’s
race politics and law jurisprudence. How should constitutional law respond to the intersection of
structural racial and political inequality?

CC: Professor Charles groups the legal arguments in response to this question into four
categories. Each recognizes the states’ primary, or plenary, role in setting election rules.

GC: The first approach is pure and unquestioned deference to the supposed sovereign right of
the state to determine its voting rules and arrange its electoral institutions in whatever manner
that is consistent with the state’s values. This total deference approach rarely acknowledges
either the racial inequality or the political inequality.

The second response is to acknowledge the racial inequality but nevertheless defer to the state on
plenary powers grounds.

A third approach is deference to the state on the theory that the race claim is, at bottom, a claim
about political power and therefore indistinguishable from a claim of unequal political power.

And lastly, there is the approach of race exceptionalism, which is the argument that racial
discrimination is an exception to the state’s plenary powers. You can do whatever you want, and
we will defer to you except where you are engaged in racial discrimination.

CC: This fourth and last approach is the one the Court took in Gomillion, rejecting arguments of
the first three types. But Professor Charles wants us to see that, as important as the Court’s ruling
in Gomillion was, there is still a fifth approach possible.

GC: There is a fifth possibility, and one that rarely finds support in the Court, but is an approach
that concedes that structural racial inequality and political oligarchy are mutually symbiotic.
Both types of inequality benefit from each other and the harm caused by one is compounded by
the other. Because the harms caused by both types are compounded by their co-occurrence, both
ought to be regulated either through congressional oversight or judicial oversight. That, I think,
is what I would recommend.

CC: Through legislative and regulatory changes in the years following Gomillion, however, the
law came to embrace something closer to the fifth possibility recommended by Professor
Charles. The law did so through the 1965 Voting Rights Act, or VRA. But as Professor Charles
explains, lately the Supreme Court’s approach to the VRA has taken some big steps backward.

GC: From my perspective, Gomillion then presents a strong question for how we ought to think
about this relationship and the structure between political equality and racial inequality, with the
Court taking the race exceptionalism approach. Gomillion also leads to the Voting Rights Act of
1965, but it also provided the framework to think about the VRA. Even though the Fifteenth
Amendment was nominally the fundamental law of the land, the VRA really is what gave
promise and life to the Fifteenth and the Fourteenth Amendment. The VRA fulfilled on the
promises of the Fifteenth Amendment, began to deliver on the guarantees of self-rule that were
implicit under the Fourteenth Amendment, and brought the South into the fold of representative
democracy, but also signaled to the nation that a new era of both racial and political equality was
at hand.

Now, we know that that regime ended in 2013 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby
County v. Alabama, in which the Court struck down Section 4-B of the act, the provision that
identified the jurisdictions required to obtain preclearance, and then sidelined Section 5 of the
act, the provision that actually required preclearance. Section 5 of the act said, okay, if you’re
subject to Section 4, you have to preclear changes related to voting. The Court’s decision in
Shelby County, though it did not come as a surprise to voting rights experts, but ended a
regulatory framework in which racial discrimination was placed front and center in the
regulatory firmament. From the Court’s perspective, the act violated the conceptions of both
state sovereignty and equal state sovereignty, the same set of ideas that we saw rejected in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot. Shelby County effectively ended the regulatory regime, and we are now
in its aftermath.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

And the question then, where ought we go from here?

The VRA represented the relationship among Black agency, Democratic politics, and
constitutional law. Black activists using the VRA sought to remake the racial order, but they also
sought to remake the political order. A protest movement changed not only politics, but it also
changed constitutional law. The task in the post-VRA world is to take the lessons that we have
learned from the regulatory regime of the VRA—that there is a strong relationship between
racial hierarchy and political oligarchy and that we need to think through how do we make both.
And how do we make both through a protest movement? And how do we make both through
constitutional law?

So, the fundamental task, I will argue, for American democracy today is to create an inclusive
political order. An inclusive order that includes everyone and which fundamentally, our political
and constitutional structure take seriously the right to vote and assures that that right is not
undermined for any group, whether it’s on the basis of race, whether it’s on the basis of ideology,
whether it’s on the basis of geography. The future of voting rights policy should focus on
developing a new political as well legal consensus, in which voting is regarded as a universal and
fundamental right, and which is made available to all. That conceptions of state sovereignty have
no role to play. That the state cannot elect between a regulatory regime that says if you
effectively discriminate on the basis of race and we can prove it, we will stop you from doing so.
But if it is simply on the basis of politics or political ideology, notwithstanding the fact that these
two things can be interrelated and that you can arbitrage between them, we’re not going to say

anything about it. We should not allow the government to regulate acts of the franchise and not
make the franchise effective. The franchise should be effective and the government should not be
allowed to change voting rules that make it harder for citizens to vote on the basis of racial,
partisan, or other types of ideological grounds, or impose other barriers to political participation.
What does this new world look like?

CC: For Professor Charles, a new world of political and racial equality will need new statutes.
He specifically focuses on The Freedom to Vote Act, a bill introduced by Senator Amy
Klobuchar and other Democrats.

GC: If you take the Freedom to Vote Act and its provisions, it takes voting seriously as a
fundamental right. It attempts to articulate our best practices and to nationalize those practices. It
undermines the conception of state sovereignty, that the state has the right to create its political
structure as it sees fit. It recognizes that the right to vote belongs to citizens, so it makes certain
sets of practices like early voting, mail voting, no-excuse absentee balloting, preventing partisan
gerrymandering, providing remedies for vote certification, modernizing voter registration – it
takes some of our best practices, nationalizes them, and recognizes that the fundamental point
here is to make voting and political participation an important aspect of democracy.

If we are to move forward, we must recognize that the relationship between political equality and
racial equality are mutually reinforcing and that we cannot have one without the other. That we
need to build a new movement that ought to be worthy of the Civil Rights Movement that led to
the 1965 Civil Rights Act, and that it is really up to us to make that determination, and it is up to
us to move the ball forward, to make political power and representative democracy true for
everyone and for all of us.

Music: Joy Ike’s “No Matter What”

CC: Professor Charles recognizes the immediate obstacles facing such a movement today, but
still, he has faith that, in time, legal change can happen.

GC: Looking at the current moment in which we find ourselves, we are in a world of
deregulation. I think there’s reason to be pessimistic that we see that there is a fairly strong
partisan divide, but we see a world in which we are extremely divided and that some of the states

are engaged in discrimination on the basis of voting, some of which is on the basis of
partisanship, some of which is on the basis of race, some of which is a combination of the two.
We’re looking at what is going on in terms of gerrymandering and redistricting, racial
gerrymandering, and redistricting in a deregulatory world. But for the first time in a very long
time, there is a strong segment of the population that wants to take not just voting equality
questions, but questions of electoral structures, the Electoral College, the composition of the
Senate, different ways of organizing alternative voting systems, want to put all of these questions
and issues on the table. We have lots of places in which we have same-day registration, early
voting. We have implemented ways of making it easier for people to participate. So, if we are
looking at where we are today, I think, yes there are reasons for despair. But if we are thinking
about the relationship between political change and political movement, and the relationship
between social movements and legal change, and how far we have come in thinking about
political participation and anticipating where we might be five, ten, perhaps fifteen years down
the road, who knows, there is possibility for hope.

Music: Joy Ike’s “Walk”

CC: Thank you for listening to this episode of “Race and Regulation.” I hope you have learned
more about the legal and regulatory dimensions of the U.S. electoral system—and how they are
linked to issues of racial equity. This podcast has been adapted from the lecture Professor Guy
Charles delivered in the fall of 2021. He spoke as part of the Penn Program on Regulation’s
lecture series on race and regulation, co-sponsored by the Office on Equity and Inclusion at the
University of Pennsylvania’s Law School.

I’m Cary Coglianese, the director of the Penn Program on Regulation. For more about our
program and free public events, visit us at pennreg.org. You can also find other episodes in our
“Race and Regulation” series wherever you get your podcasts. This podcast was produced by
Patty McMahon, with help from Andy Coopersmith, our program’s managing director. Our
music is by Philadelphia-based artist, Joy Ike.

